Abstract. Many variants of Chaum and van Antwerpen's undeniable signatures have been proposed to achieve specific properties desired in real-world applications of cryptography. Among them, directed signatures were introduced by Lim and Lee in 1993. Directed signatures differ from the well-known confirmer signatures in that the signer has the simultaneous abilities to confirm, deny and individually convert a signature. The universal conversion of these signatures has remained an open problem since their introduction in 1993. This paper provides a positive answer to this quest by showing a very efficient design for universally convertible directed signatures (UCDS) both in terms of computational complexity and signature size. Our construction relies on the so-called xyz-trick applicable to bilinear map groups. We define proper security notions for UCDS schemes and show that our construction is secure in the random oracle model, under computational assumptions close to the CDH and DDH assumptions. Finally, we introduce and realize traceable universally convertible directed signatures where a master tracing key allows to link signatures to their direction.
Introduction
Digital signatures were introduced to identify the source of digital data. In particular they are non-repudiable and universally verifiable. For centuries, seals and handwritten signatures were attached to documents to indicate the issuer's identity. To determinate the authenticity of this identity, the original scripts have to be validated in some sense. In the electronic world, however, the ease of recopy and thereby distribution of digital signatures associated to the selfauthenticating property may pose a serious threat to the signer's privacy. The concept of undeniable signature was first addressed at Crypto'89 by Chaum and van Antwerpen [12] . These signatures have the appealing property that a purported signature cannot be checked without the cooperation of the signer and cannot be denied if the latter has indeed generated the signature. They have found numerous applications in applied cryptography, but the obvious problem with this idea is that in any setting where the signer becomes unavailable, nothing can be determined. Hence, Boyar, Chaum, Damgård and Pedersen [7] proposed convertible undeniable signatures which provide the additional feature of converting (individually or universally) the undeniable signatures to ordinary signatures. Another approach has produced various flavors of undeniable signatures which may also be verified by interacting with an entity which has been designated by the signer. Directed signatures introduced in 1993 by Lim and Lee [21] , (designated) confirmer signatures [11] , or limited verifier signatures [1] are among the best known examples. All of them, which we gather under the generic name of delegated undeniable signatures, guarantee to the recipient of a signature the ability to verify it, even when the signer cannot (or refuses to) do so. Directed signatures find a prominent application in the realization of complete peer-to-peer secure messaging systems and are a powerful tool to devise protocols for contract signing [2] or verifiable signature sharing [15] . They propose an individual conversion operation, but up to now none of them provides a mechanism for universal conversion 1 . From a formal point of view, directed signatures and confirmer signatures are quite similar, the only notable difference, apart from the signer's ability to convert signatures, being the real-world applications the authors had in mind. In brief, a universally convertible directed signature scheme enjoys the following properties. Assuming a signer A and a confirmer B, seen as registered users of the system, A produces signatures that only B (and A her/himself) can verify. These operations are independent and performed concurrently, meaning that A and B do not have to interact with each other to achieve either one of these operations. The literature on confirmer signatures is inconsistent on whether the signer is able to confirm and/or deny signatures. In the recent formalization of confirmer signatures [9, 17] , in order to protect the signer from a coercer, this ability is delegated only to the designated confirmer. However, the signer's ability to confirm, deny and sometimes convert signatures is requested or strongly desirable in Definition 2 (Bilinear group system generator). A bilinear group system generator is a probabilistic algorithm Setup that takes as input a security parameter k and outputs a bilinear group system (q,
Computational Problems in Bilinear Group Systems
Depending on its practical embodiment, a bilinear group system may or may not provide an efficiently computable isomorphism from G 1 to G 2 . In particular, ρ may not be efficiently invertible. In this case, there is a computational separation between problems defined over G 1 and G 2 . For instance, the Decisional DiffieHellman problem DDH [G 2 ] on G 2 is trivial since ρ(xP 2 ), yP 2 = P 1 , xyP 2 for any x, y ∈ Z * q , but the same problem defined over G 1 may remain somewhat intractable. Several new computational problems of various flavors have recently been defined over bilinear groups. We now give the definition of the complexity assumptions we will be using in this paper.
Tripartite Diffie-Hellman (TDH):
This computational problem is at least as difficult as the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem [6] . Similarly, Decisional Tripartite Diffie-Hellman is defined as the problem of distinguishing the distribution of (co-)Diffie-Hellman tuples {(xP 1 
be a bilinear group system. Given group elements (xP 1 , yP 1 
The security of our signatures also relies on the following new computational problem:
Remark 1.
Even though not really considered as classical, the KEA1 assumption 2 was introduced in 1991 by Damgård [14] . Roughly speaking, KEA1 captures the intuition that any algorithm which, given a pair (P, xP) ∈ G 2 , computes a pair (Q, xQ) ∈ G 2 must "know" log P2 Q. It is easily seen that under KEA1, the FSDH assumption is equivalent to a co-Diffie-Hellman assumption defined over G 1 and G 2 .
Designated-Verifier Proofs of equality of two discrete logarithms
To make our security reductions complete, the executions of the confirming/denying protocols have to be simulated in the random oracle model. Therefore we rely in the design of our scheme on a procedure allowing to prove in a non-transferable way the equality (or the inequality) of two discrete logarithms without revealing information on their value. We make use of non-interactive designated-verifier zero-knowledge proofs [18] of equality of discrete logarithms log α β = log g y. The notation is dvpk [x :
, where α and g are two elements of same prime order in their respective groups. We use the notation
for the dual proof of inequality. Designated-verifier proofs form the basis of denying and confirmation protocols in many undeniable and confirmer signature schemes in the literature. We refer the reader to [18] for further details.
Universally Convertible Directed Signatures

Definition
Given an integer k, a universally convertible directed signature scheme DS with security parameter k is formally defined by the following:
-generation of public parameters: DS.Setup is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input k and outputs public parameters (which include a description of the signature space); -key generation for signer A and confirmer B: DS.Signer.KeyGen is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input the public parameters and outputs a signing key pair (pk A , sk A ). DS.Confirmer.KeyGen is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input the public parameters and outputs a confirmer key pair (pk B , sk B ); -key-registration: DS.Register is a protocol between a user and a "Key Registration Authority" which takes as input the public parameters and the user's public key pk, and outputs a pair (pk, notif) where notif ∈ {accept, reject} is the registration authorization decision. The fact that a given public key has been properly registered with the authority, is guaranteed by a signature of it by the authority. -signature generation: DS.Sign is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a bitstring m ∈ {0, 1} , the signer's private key sk A , the confirmer's public key pk B and the public parameters. Moreover, a universally convertible directed signature scheme must satisfy the following (informally defined, precisely detailed in the next section) properties:
1. correctness: properly formed (A, B)-directed, A-converted and B-converted signatures must be accepted by the verification algorithms; 2. unforgeability: it is computationally infeasible, without the knowledge of the signer's private key, to produce a directed signature that is accepted by the verification algorithms or by the confirming protocols; 3. completeness and soundness: the verification protocols are complete and sound, where completeness means that valid (invalid) signatures can always be proven valid (invalid) and soundness means that no valid (invalid) signature can be proven invalid (valid). 4. invisibility: given a message m and a purported (A, B)-directed signature σ on m, it is computationally infeasible, without the knowledge of the confirmer's or the signer's private key, to ascertain that σ is a valid (A, B)-directed signature of m. 5. non-transferability: a user participating in an execution of the confirming/denying protocols does not obtain information that could be used to convince a third party about the validity/invalidity of a signature.
Security Notions for Universally Convertible Directed Signatures
Unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks. The de facto standard notion of security for digital signatures was formalized by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [16] as existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks (EF-CMA). For universally convertible directed signatures, the unforgeability security is defined along the same lines, with the notable difference that the adversary can be any of the confirmers chosen by the signer. Therefore, in the attack scenario, the forger A is allowed to request signatures directed to any registered user of her choice (whose secret key might be known to her). Besides, signer individual/universal conversion algorithms might also leak information to the adversary. We therefore suppose that the adversary knows the confirmers' private keys, the associated signer-generated universal trapdoors, and we allow her to request the individual conversion of any signature of her choice. As usual, the forger has the natural restriction that the returned forgery (including a message, a directed signature and a confirmer's identity) has not been returned by the signing oracle during the game.
Invisibility of signatures.
The strongest security notion for undeniable and confirmer signatures is the one of invisibility introduced by Chaum, van Heijst and Pfitzmann in [13] . We precisely define the notion of signature invisibility under adaptive chosen message attacks in our context, introducing two flavors of invisibility, weak-Inv-CMA and Inv-CMA.
We consider an adversary A that runs in two stages: in the find stage, A takes as input the public keys pk A and pk B , and outputs a message m together with some state information I . In the guess stage, A gets as input I and a challenge signature σ either formed by signing the message m or chosen at random in the signature space. Then A returns her guess as to whether σ is a valid (A, B)-directed signature on m or not.
In the weak-Inv-CMA-model, the adversary has access in both stages to the signing oracle Sign and to the confirming/denying oracle Confirm and Deny. In the Inv-CMA-model, A is also given access to the individual conversion oracle Convert, and to the universal trapdoor generation oracle Trapdoor. In both cases, she is allowed to invoke these oracles on any message and any confirmer of her choice with the restriction of not sending (m , σ , pk B ) to the oracles Confirm, Deny and Convert in the second stage and not sending pk B to the oracle Trapdoor at any stage.
, q Reg (k) queries to the given oracles, and has forgery success (resp. distinguishing advantage) ≥ ε(k) against DS with security parameter k.
We now describe our first universally convertible directed signature scheme which for readability is denoted again by DS.
Generation of public parameters DS.Setup: Given a security parameter k, the public parameters are (q, . Similarly, a user registers his signing public key pk A = (X 1 , X 2 ) = (x 1 P 1 , x 2 P 2 ) by proving in zero-knowledge her/his knowledge of x 1 and x 2 . The fact that a given public key has been properly registered with the authority, is guaranteed by a signature of the it by the authority.
Signature generation DS.Sign: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1}
* and the public key Y of a confirmer,
A picks a random r $ ← − Z * q , and computes U = rP 2 and V = (rx 1 )(
, A restarts the signing procedure with a new value for r. The signature is σ = (U, V ).
Verification by confirmer/signer DS.Confirmer.Verify: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1} * and a signature σ = (U, V ), B checks whether σ ∈ G 2 × G 1 and V, X 2 
DS.Signer.Verify: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1} * and a signature σ = (U, V ), A checks whether σ ∈ G 2 × G 1 and V, X 2 
Confirmation and disavowal protocols DS.Signer.{Confirm, Deny}: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1} * and a signature σ = (U, V ), A proves to any third party that
DS.Confirmer.{Confirm, Deny}: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1} * and a signature σ = (U, V ), B proves to any third party that
Individual conversion and verification algorithms
DS.User.VerifySigner: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1} * and a converted signatureσ A = (U, V, W ), any user checks whether 
Universal trapdoor generation and verification algorithms
* and a signature σ = (U, V ), any user uses the trapdoor T to check whether V,
The correctness of DS is obvious, and the completeness and soundness of all protocols are classical results [10] . We now discuss a few facts about our scheme.
Efficiency. An (A, B)-directed signature σ is a pair of elements in G 2 × G 1 , being in that comparable to Boneh and Boyen's recent signature scheme [5] . Signature generation requires an inversion modulo q followed by one exponentiation in G 1 and one exponentiation in G 2 . Therefore no pairing is required. Signature verification by the confirmer is a bit more demanding as a couple of pairings have to be computed. We note that conversion procedures, as well as the generation of a universal trapdoor require a single exponentiation in G 1 or G 2 and are therefore pairing-free.
Verifiability Properties. We note that our scheme is fully verifiable in the sense that all private operations are independently verifiable by third parties. These properties are desirable even though not requested in our definitions. If our system serves as a basic primitive in a cryptographic protocol typically, full verifiability may allow early detection of cheating behaviors and localization of malicious parties.
Security. We note first that the property of non-transferability is fulfilled by our scheme as a direct consequence of the use of designated-verifier proofs in confirmation/disavowal protocols. Further, we state that our scheme resists existential forgeries and that signatures are invisible. Both security reductions stand in the random oracle model. Proof. The proof relies on the Forking Lemma [22] and is in spirit rather similar to the security proof of known discrete-log-based signature schemes such as Schnorr. Assume A is a forger that (k, t, q, ε)-breaks DS. Here, q H stands for the number of queries submitted by A to H since H is viewed as a random oracle. We construct a reduction algorithm B that, by interacting with A, solves the FSDH problem with time bound and success probability as claimed in Theorem 1. Algorithm B is given bilinear map parameters (q, 
Theorem 1 (Unforgeability of DS). Let t, q
H ∈ N N , q = (q Sign ,P 1 , P 2 , g t , G 1 , G 2 , G t , ·, · , ρ) generated
Simulation of H. Given m ∈ {0, 1}
* and (U, Since B 0 ( ) knows x 1 , B 0 ( ) is able to verify any given directed signature and consequently, to engage successfully in one of the two protocols H returns h j , B also  memorizes , σ 1 , . . . , σ .
Replay Stage. As is classical with forking-based reductions, we define a second probabilistic subroutine B 1 ( ) of B which role is essentially to replay the last and successful execution of B 0 ( ) until the moment when H is about to output h j , and then simulate all oracles with fresh random values from that moment on. The tape being given by the find stage, B 1 ( ) runs A with random tape , transmits the same public parameters (q, P 1 , P 2 , g t , G 1 , G 2 , G t , ·, · , ρ) to A, as well as pk A = (X 1 , X 2 ). Then B 1 ( ) simulates the oracles as follows, using its own random tape π. Key Retrieval Stage. We perform a specific stage that allows B to retrieve the confirmer private key y associated to the find-stage forgery (Y , m , σ ), i.e. such that Y = y P 1 . To this end, B replays B 1 once with a slightly modified random tape π ≈ π such that replaying the registration stage of Y by A allows to extract y . As registration is performed via a non-interactive dvpk of a discrete log, modifying the 'challenge' value returned by the internal hash function of the protocol yields y by knowledge extraction 3 . B then stops A and memorizes y . (h 1 , . . . , h qtot(k) ) leading to a forgery of index j and ε j = Pr (h 1 , . . . , h qtot(k) ) ∈ H j , the probability being taken over all the values of h 1 , . . . , h qtot(k) over Z * q . Note that the ε i 's may depend on A and w but in any case j ε j = ε(k) must hold. Following our remark above, there must be at least q Sign (k) values of j for which ε j = 0. We now invoke the (h 1 , . . . , h j−1 ) such that
Simulation of H. If the query index is i < j,
Z * q−1 (unknown to B) such that ∆ = r(x + h) −1 P 1 and ∆ = r(x + h ) −1 P 1 . B poses R = rP 1 and Q = (h − h) −1 (∆ − ∆ ) = r[(x + h)(x + h )] −1 P 1 = [(x + h)(x + h )] −1 R, or aborts if h − h ≡ 0 (mod q). Finally, one has ∆ = (x + h ) Q so that ∆ − h Q = xQ. Since R = (x + h)(x + h )Q, we get R − (h + h )xQ − hh Q = x 2 Q
Lemma 1 (Splitting Lemma [22]). Noting X j the set of vectors
where the probability is taken over
one has
We expect the find and key retrieval stages to require at most ε(k) −1 + 1 executions of A. Suppose that the transcript of H when B 0 ( ) succeeds is (h 1 , . . . , h qtot(k) ) ∈ H j for some j. This event occurs with non-zero probability ε j /ε(k) as soon as ε j = 0. Further assume that (h 1 , . . . , h j−1 ) ∈ X j ; the probability that this occurs is at least 1/2. Then the expected number of executions of B 1 ( ) is 2/ε j . Putting it all together, and taking into account the abortion case h ≡ h (mod q), B succeeds with probability Remark 2. The simulation of the dvpks imposes the random oracle model and we therefore must allow the adversary to query the internal oracles used to compute proofs. The simulation cost induced by these queries are included into q H .
We also state that DS is weakly invisible under the assumption that the Decisional Tripartite Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable: Proof. We show that, assuming the hardness of the Decisional Tripartite DiffieHellman DTDH, DS is weakly invisible under an adaptive chosen-message attack. Our reduction is in essence similar to previously known reductions in the standard model, and we therefore skip minor details. Note that H needs not be seen as a random oracle. The fact that we require the random oracle model only stems from the need to simulate zero-knowledge proofs.
Theorem 2 (Weak Invisibility of DS). Let t, q
Assume A is an attacker that (k, t, q, ε)-breaks the weak invisibility of DS as defined earlier. We construct a reduction algorithm B that, by interacting with A, solves a DTDH instance with time bound and advantage as claimed in Theorem 2. The outline of the reduction is as follows. Algorithm B is given an bilinear group system (q,
s goal is to decide whether δ ≡ αβγ (mod q). B does so by interacting with the forger A as follows. First, B picks a random x 2 $ ← − Z * q and sets X 1 = αP 1 and X 2 = x 2 P 2 . Then B sends the public parameters to A as well as the signer public key (X 1 , X 2 ) and the challenge confirmer public key Y = βP 1 . B attempts to simulate all oracles throughout the find stage, as shown later. A then returns a challenge message m . B then picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sets U = γP 2 
and σ is returned to A as the signature challenge. Throughout the guess stage, B simulates the oracles the same way it did in the find stage. A finally outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} and B returns 1 to its own challenger if b = b or 0 otherwise. When δ ≡ αβγ (mod q), signature simulations will all be correct and the advantage of A in guessing b is at least ε(k). In the case δ ≡ αβγ (mod q), the signatures output by B are simply invalid and A may then behave arbitrarily. Overall, B correctly guesses its own challenge with probability negligibly close to ε(k)/2.
Key Retrieval for
A must have registered the public key Y = yP 1 prior to requesting any signature of type (m, Y ), so that B recovers y via registration replay as in the proof of unforgeability. This requires to reboot and replay A with the same random tape up to the point in executing the dvpk when bringing fresh randomness in the 'challenge' hash value allows to extract the discrete log y. Knowing y, B continues the second execution of A until a new confirmer key Y is registered, and so forth. This strategy ensures that B can actually recover all the confirmer private keys matching the public keys registered by A. The price to pay is a factor q Reg (k) in the number of times A has to be executed. Note that, since we make use of non-interactive dvpk of a discrete logarithm, there is no concurrent interleving of registrations and therefore the "reboot and replay" technique applies readily. Reduction Cost. As discussed above, B's own challenge is solved with proba-
Simulation of Signatures for
where p 2 is an explicit polynomiaml and the second term comes from the simulations of all oracles. This is as claimed in Theorem 2.
Invisible Universally Convertible Directed Signatures. We refer the reader to Appendix A for a proof that DS is invisible under a non-standard complexity assumption referred to as the q s -Tripartite-DCAA problem.
Because of its simplicity, however, our scheme admits many variations. A possible direction to reach invisibility under a weaker assumption consists in replacing the individual conversion algorithms by standard non-interactive zeroknowledge (nizk) proofs of knowledge of equality/inequality of discrete logarithms. The nizk proof is then appended to the directed signature as a replacement of the third signature part W . It is then possible to obtain invisibility under the Decisional Tripartite Diffie-Hellman assumption. The proof is very similar to the one of Theorem 2 except that signature conversions are provided to the adversary by simulating the corresponding nizk proofs for signatures issued by the reduction. The other cases are upper bounded in probability by the unforgeability property of our scheme.
Universally Convertible Directed Signatures with Traceability
Directed signatures find a prominent application in the realization of complete peer-to-peer secure messaging systems. In such a system, users have a unique key pair {pk = (X 1 , X 2 ), sk = (x 1 , x 2 )} where X 1 = x 1 P 1 , X 2 = x 2 P 2 and x 1 plays simultaneously the role of a signing and of a confirming key. By misuse of language, we sometimes call x 1 the anonymity key and x 2 the signing key for reasons that will appear clearly in what follows. We view a confirmer more like a regular receiver of a signed message and preferably adopt this term in the sequel. In authenticated messaging systems, putting a restriction on the ability to verify signatures is of a certain interest towards the users' privacy. The property of invisibility guarantees this privacy until one of the two parties wishes to end it.
There are real-life contexts, however, in which conferring this ability to a trusted authority acting in extreme circumstances is desirable. One may think of private contract signing for instance, where criminals make use of the system to sign illegal contracts that are not publicly verifiable. What is really desired is a traceability mechanism 4 enabling a tracing authority (TA) to link upon request directed signatures to their direction i.e. the identities of their signer and receiver. We now introduce an extension of our scheme that supports signature tracing.
Description of the Scheme DST
Setup and Key generation
The generation of public parameters and keys in the system is essentially the same as above, except that we include Z = zP 2 ∈ G 2 into the system public parameters. The tracing key is z ∈ Z * q . Moreover, we require users to (securely) submit their anonymity keys x 1 to the Key Registration Authority (KRA). A receipt is returned to the registering user after that, under the form of a nizk proof ψ(X 1 ) that the KRA knows x 1 .
Signature generation
Now, given a message m ∈ {0, 1} * and the public key Y of the receiver, signer 
Other operations
The verification procedure and the confirming/denying protocols are unchanged, except that the non-interactive proof π is verified. Signature conversions are done the same way i.e. by appending x 1 U or yU , or a nizk proof of knowledge of x 1 or y to the signature. The generation of trapdoors is unchanged. Universal verification requires the additional check that π is correct.
Signature Tracing
A prerequisite for signature tracing is the recovery of the anonymity key x 1 of the suspected user. This is done by the Key Registration Authority upon judicial request. Now the TA is given a signature σ = (U, W, T, V, π) of some message m and is asked to decide whether σ was issued by the given user and if so, to whom the signature was directed. The TA first ascertains that π is correct and searches in the public key database a key Y for which T, W −zU = Y, P 2 . The search is always successful, because a proof that Y lies in the set of registered keys is included in π and is known to be correct. Now given Y and x 1 , the TA checks whether V, X 2 + H(m, U, W, T, Y )P 2 = Y, U x1 . We note that in case of mismatch, the TA is left with anonymous material meaning that if the signature was issued by some user A then the identity of A is preserved. This property is in fact computationally guaranteed, as stated later.
Security Analysis
We state that (A, B)-directed signatures are existentially unforgeable and invisible under adaptive chosen-message attack for any user = A, B, TA. We rely again on the FSDH and the DTDH assumptions in the random oracle model. Proof. The proof is similar to those of the security of the scheme DS and will be given in the full version of the paper.
Theorem 3 (Unforgeability and Weak Invisibility
We also state two important properties fulfilled by the tracing mechanism. They tell us in essence that beyond traceability, the Tracing Authority has no 'hidden powers' over standard users of the system. We argue that these properties come from the computational separation between the anonymity key x 1 and the signing key x 2 . In fact, after the x 1 -part of the secret key of a traced user has been revoked, signatures from that user remain unforgeable because x 2 has not been compromised. The revoked user could even be rehabilitated and a new anonymity key generated to replace the revoked one. This allows a clear separation of powers invested in users and authorities of the system. Due to lack of space, the complete proofs will be given in the full version of the paper.
Theorem 4 (Abuse-free Traceability). Signatures issued by user
Technical Considerations
Implementation of the nizk proof π. The nizk proof π is implemented as a Fiat-Shamir-transformed conjunction of interactive proofs of the predicates forming π. We rely on prior art [8] to provide an efficient procedure to generate π in practice. Performances. Signature generation requires 2 exponentiations over group G 1 and 2 over group G 2 , and no pairing. Here too, off-line/online signature generation trade-offs are possible by appending a third key part X 3 = x 3 P 2 in the user key. Signature conversions and the generation of trapdoors require a single exponentiation over G 2 or G 1 respectively. All verification algorithms require at least two evaluations of the bilinear map. We note that the tracing procedure requires O(N ) bilinear map evaluations where N is the number of registered (non-revoked) users. We leave as an open problem to find similar schemes admitting a tracing procedure in polylog complexity in all parameters. Extensions. Invisibility under the Decisional Tripartite Diffie-Hellman assumption is obtained by replacing the individual conversion procedures by standard nizk proofs. All operations within the scheme (signature conversion, trapdoor generation) are easily adapted to be verifiable. Among other possible extensions, we cite multi-receiver directed signatures.
Conclusion
We properly defined security notions for directed signatures that support the additional property of universal conversion. Using the xyz-trick, we realized the first scheme featuring both individual and universal conversion of signatures, thereby addressing a problem left open since 1993. The new scheme offers attractive practical advantages in terms of signature length and performances. In comparison with previous works, the computational costs for the signer in the signature generation, the confirmation/disavowal protocols and the conversion algorithms, are among the smallest of all delegated undeniable signature schemes. We have proved the security of our scheme in the random oracle model under computational assumptions closely related to the Diffie-Hellman and Decision Diffie-Hellman assumptions on bilinear map groups.
Finally, we introduced traceable directed signatures as a powerful extension to allow a Tracing Authority within the system to link signatures to their direction i.e. issuer and receiver. We believe that our signature schemes are simultaneously efficient and customizable, and we expect to see new cryptographic applications of our work in the future. The xyz-trick will certainly have other applications in future works as well. For example, our scheme is easily extended to achieve the time-selective conversion property as in [20] .
